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The ethics of forensic professionalism is often couched in terms of competing individual and 
societal values. Indeed, the welfare of individuals is often secondary to the requirements of 
society, especially given the public nature of courts of law, forensic hospitals, jails, and prisons. 
We explore the weaknesses of this dichotomous approach to forensic ethics, offering an analysis 
of Psychology's historical narrative especially relevant to the national security and correctional 
settings. We contend that a richer, more robust ethical analysis is available if practitioners 
consider the multiple perspectives in the forensic encounter, and acknowledge the multiple 
influences of personal, professional, and social values. The setting, context, or role is not 
sufficient to determine the ethics of forensic practice. 
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Not just welfare over justice: Ethics in forensic consultation 
 
The public forum – the root of the term “forensic” – provides a setting where individual 
welfare and social justice strain against each other. Professionals who work in public fora, or 
forensic practitioners, work in settings like courtrooms, correctional facilities, and national 
security agencies that raise one of the most painful dilemmas in professional ethics: deciding 
whether their primary duty is to the legal aspects of their work or to the clinical and scientific 
standards they employ. The law determines many of the elements critical to forensic work, while 
the scientific and clinical professions socialize, train, and introduce practitioners to their craft. 
The public forum consequently provides the setting where these ethical and professional tensions 
play out. 
Nowhere is this tension borne out more poignantly than in questions of community 
security, namely in assessing individuals who may present a danger to those around them. 
Individuals committed or incarcerated, for example, as a danger to commit suicide, to terrorize, 
assault, assassinate, rape, or set fires raise harrowing concerns for their safety and the safety of 
families, neighbors, and children. Such individuals bear enormous scrutiny as society determines 
whether they can re-enter the community and face high thresholds for that re-entry. In such cases 
it is almost a matter of faith that legal, and indeed community, standards will trump other 
considerations. After all, the decisions are often made in courtrooms – presided over by 
professionals with legal, not clinical, training. 
Yet, a social contract is in place that requires special protections for those in vulnerable 
positions. Prisoners are protected by Supreme Court rulings that require avoiding “deliberate 
indifference” to their health (Estelle v. Gamble, 1976); patients interacting with clinical 
professionals are afforded informed consent, and accused criminals require Miranda warnings 
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and access to counsel. There are also professional standards for psychologists, psychiatrists, 
nurses, social workers, and scientists that require attention to the rights of individual evaluees 
(Candilis et al, 2007). 
It may be clear that it is not sufficient for one set of values to trump another. The 
principles guiding community safety and law come up against not only the principles supporting 
individual rights and care but also the expectations of communities and organizations. The public 
setting of the courtroom invites consideration of multiple perspectives in an adversarial 
framework called imperfect procedural justice (Rawls, 1971). Recognizing that Truth is an ideal 
in human affairs, it is procedure that matters most of all, so that if a fair process is followed, 
Truth can be closely approximated even if it is not attained.  
It may be tempting to consider an equal balance between justice and welfare as a solution 
to the tensions of forensic practice. In fact a wide-spread principlist model urges recognition of 
competing prima facie principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and autonomy 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). The principles are equal at first look (prima facie), but can be 
weighed against each other by following certain ethical rules.  
The difficulty has been that ethics and professionalism have never been about principles 
alone (Arras, 1997). Context matters, so that the narrative of those involved in the forensic 
encounter – evaluee, evaluator, victim, witnesses, community – is part of the forensic and ethical 
analysis. In forensic reports, collateral sources are used to paint a complete picture of events. 
School and hospital records contribute to analysis and outcome. The evolving thinking of the 
profession colors the result as well. Context comes from the full story or narrative and allows a 
deeper understanding of the intentions and motives of actors in the human drama.  
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This is a language that arises from the new perspective of narrative ethics, a perspective 
that offers a powerful new tool for exploring the conflict and tension of forensic cases. For 
deciding which ethic comes first – which duty is paramount – narrative provides the beginnings 
of a richer and more robust discussion of forensic professionalism. 
We will follow the historical narrative of psychology, at times comparing it to psychiatry, 
to tease out the primary influences on forensic practice, and offer a unified model that goes 
beyond the role-based ethics of either justice or welfare. We will underscore the profession’s 
involvement in military and security affairs to develop the point that forensic practice requires a 
unified, integrated, and robust vision of professional ethics.  
 Historical Context: The Roots of Psychology 
Psychology developed out of the traditions of moral philosophy. It developed in the 19th 
century as an experimental science attempting to quantify and measure ideas that had fascinated 
philosophers for centuries: ideas like consciousness, sensation, and perception (Grisso, 1993).  
Indeed, experimental psychologists made up the American Psychological Association (APA) in 
its early years.  However, during the early part of the 20th century, some psychologists began 
applying psychology outside the laboratory (see e.g. Grisso, 2001; and 
http://www.apa.org/about/apa/archives/apa-history.aspx).  
During World War II, for example, psychologists developed group tests for military 
examiners to determine quickly the draft eligibility of young men, and provided mental health 
services to hospitalized soldiers upon their return home (Fisher, 2003). Thus “clinical” 
psychology – the application of basic psychology to evaluating and treating people – was born 
(Grisso, 2001).  Clinical psychology experienced considerable growth during and after World 
War II.   
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In response to the advent of clinical psychology, the APA broadened its scope after the 
World War, from the experimental science of psychology to the promotion of human welfare 
(e.g., clinical applications). This included efforts well-known today, from the treatment of 
families and individuals to consultations in school systems and workplaces. Today, APA remains 
the largest scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States. 
In keeping to its roots, it continues to serve both experimental and applied fields. 
Development of an Ethics Code in Psychology   
In response to the increased professional activity and public visibility of psychologists 
during and after World War II, psychology developed a code of ethics.  In 1947, APA appointed 
a Committee on Ethical Standards for Psychologists to develop a code that was to guide both 
experimental and applied psychologists and be applicable across diverse roles and contexts 
(Fisher, 2003). One of the members of the original committee wrote about their task, “In a field 
so complex, where individual and social values are yet but ill defined, the desire to play fairly 
must be given direction and consistency by some rules of the game” (Hobbs, 1948, p.81).   
In recognizing both individual and social values, the committee gathered more than 1,000 
case examples of ethical problems encountered by psychologists in their daily work (Fisher, 
2003). These cases ranged from psychologists’ relationships with and responsibilities to others, 
confrontations between academic freedom and McCarthyism, to dilemmas faced by 
psychologists working in industry (Fisher, 2003). The organization consequently drafted its code 
based on the ethical issues in these case examples.  In a process that would anticipate future 
codes in other professions, the authors included both aspirational standards (i.e., ideal standards 
of conduct toward which all psychologists should strive) as well as professional values and 
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practical techniques for identifying and resolving moral problems (Fisher, 2003). After revisions 
and critiques from the membership, APA’s first code of ethics was published in 1953. 
The APA ethics code has undergone nine revisions since that time, but it remains 
applicable to all brands of psychologists today – no matter the setting in which psychologists 
work or the type of work they do. There are both enforceable rules (e.g., minimum standards of 
conduct for which violations have consequences) and aspirational principles in the current ethics 
code.  In an attempt to maintain a realistic regulatory stance, the APA expects that enforceable 
standards are only enforceable for APA members, but aspirational principles apply to all 
psychologists regardless of membership in the APA.   
For our purposes in determining the ethics of forensic practice, it is the aspirational 
principles that are most relevant. They comprise five broad goals from the principlist model: 
Beneficence and Nonmaleficence (i.e., striving to do good and do no harm), Fidelity and 
responsibility (i.e., meeting responsibilities, avoiding conflicts, maintaining trustworthiness), 
Integrity (i.e., maintaining honest communications and accuracy), Justice (i.e., striving to ensure 
all people have fair and equitable access to and benefit from scientific knowledge), and Respect 
for people’s rights and dignity (i.e., taking precautions to safeguard individuals’ rights and 
welfare, and striving to be aware of and eliminate the effects of prejudice). The cardinal 
principles of professional ethics are recognizable here, as is the idea that ethics apply across all 
settings and contexts. 
Psychology’s Approach to Dual Agency   
Over time, the most parsimonious approach to professional ethics has been to apply 
principles within a specific role or to see practitioners as agents of a specific institution (Bradley, 
1988). Professionals may act as forensic experts in one setting but as citizens and parents in 
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others. They may be agents of a court, a hospital, a school committee, or a family at different 
times. They do not act as parents when they serve as courtroom experts; they wear different 
“hats” depending on the role or context. The tension arises when the principles guiding one role 
come up against the principles of another. This is the problem of dual agency – a problem that 
consequently invites input from more than two perspectives. 
A dual agent, then, is a person or company representing both parties to a transaction (e.g., 
a real estate agent representing both buyer and seller).  This situation may lead to a conflict of 
interest, and – for real estate agents at least – is illegal in many states.  Psychologists usually 
serve in a single capacity by applying psychological knowledge to individual cases; that is, the 
client is the individual receiving the service. However, psychologists represent distinct values 
derived from many sources: their profession, upbringing, education, and experience, so they may 
become involved in a further conflict because third parties are interested in the outcome of their 
work. The third parties may be interested in the result for a variety of reasons that do not involve 
an evaluative, diagnostic, or treatment relationship with the person to whom services are 
provided.   
Courts, for example, may wish to know whether a person has a mental illness and what 
the effects of the illness might be on that person’s behavior.  Police departments may wish to 
know whether the officers they intend to hire are psychologically stable.  Disability insurers may 
wish to know whether patients are legitimately ill or whether they are malingering in order to 
receive payment. Governments may want to know whether a person poses a legitimate threat to 
the safety and security of the state, and so forth.  In these cases, it is not clear who the client is. 
That is, without clarification of this question, the person being evaluated or treated may think 
s/he is the client, while the third party paying the bill may think the same. 
 10 
Without clarification of this agency question – “Who is the client?” – and recognition of 
the multiple influences on the answer, each one of the five aspirational principles of the 
psychologist’s code could be violated.  Let’s say, for example, that a judge wants to know 
whether Jimmy Doe, a defendant accused of an attempted assassination, is mentally ill.  Dr. 
Smith, a psychologist, accepts the referral and conducts a diagnostic evaluation.  Mr. Doe 
appreciates receiving the diagnostic workup and very much wants help, so he divulges a great 
deal of private information.  He tells Dr. Smith about his father sexually abusing him when he 
was a child; he talks about his guilt over sexually abusing children in his neighborhood; and he 
reports current thoughts of killing himself.   
If Dr. Smith did not make the purpose of the evaluation thoroughly clear to Mr. Doe (and 
remind him several times), inform him how the information would be used, and make clear that 
the role of the evaluator was not that of a treating professional, there is a high likelihood of 
harms unrelated to the purposes of the evaluation. These harms include: 
 harm to Mr. Doe (i.e., by disclosing several new crimes) in violation of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence 
 conflicting expectations of Dr. Smith by the two parties, a situation in which one of the 
parties is bound to have their expectations violated, contravening fidelity and 
responsibility   
 damage to Dr. Smith’s integrity; he has not communicated honestly about his role or the 
purpose of the evaluation with one or perhaps both of the parties 
 ignoring Mr. Doe’s clinical needs: It is not clear whether Dr. Smith should take action to 
connect Mr. Doe with the treatment services he clearly needs, which is perhaps in 
violation of beneficence and possibly fairness, the justice principle 
 11 
 presenting irrelevant and inflammatory information in court: If Dr. Smith were to write or 
testify about Mr. Doe’s experience of sexual abuse at the hands of his father, particularly 
if it was not relevant to the purposes of the evaluation, it would violate the principle of 
respect for persons. 
 The APA ethics code includes specific standards to help psychologists navigate these 
agency problems. For example, APA Standard 3.10 “Informed Consent” protects the self-
governing and privacy rights of those with whom psychologists work by requiring psychologists 
to “obtain the informed consent of the individual or individuals using language that is reasonably 
understandable to that person or persons…” Informed consent procedures mandate that 
psychologists describe the nature and purpose of the service as well as the limits of 
confidentiality.  Specific guidance is provided for informed consent with persons who are legally 
incapable of giving informed consent, as well as the special exceptions to informed consent 
when psychological services are court-ordered or otherwise mandated.  
In addition, there are several standards to guide psychologists toward principled behavior 
in light of the special ethical challenges associated with serving in a dual role.  For example, 
APA Standard 3.07 “Third-Party Requests for Services” makes clear the requirement of 
explicitly identifying “Who is the client?”  Psychologists must specifically identify the client to 
all individuals involved, clarify the nature and purpose of the service (including the non-
treatment role of the psychologist), and the limits of confidentiality. 
As a final example, APA Standard 3.11 “Psychological Services Delivered To or 
Through Organizations” goes beyond the individual consent protections in standard 3.10 to apply 
to forensic evaluations, consulting, or other psychological services delivered to or through 
organizations. This standard builds on 3.07 and 3.10 by requiring psychologists to provide 
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information to and obtain informed consent from the organization as well as individual evaluees.  
Psychologists must clarify the intended recipients of their services, which of the individuals are 
clients, the relationship the psychologist will have with each person and with the organization, 
and meet the other elements of informed consent as well.  If the psychologist will be prevented 
from providing feedback about the results to either the organization or the individual, the 
psychologist must make clear the obligations to all parties at the outset. The APA consequently 
identifies obligations to the profession in making clear the influence of multiple agents in 
otherwise classic dual agency cases. 
Ethics in the Context of National Security1   
Nowhere are the multiple influences on forensic professional ethics more salient than in 
discussions of national security. If the social structure that offers a foundation for professional 
practice is threatened, professionals can easily be recruited to assess threats, predict outcomes, 
and elicit information. This is precisely what occurred after the terror attacks of September 11, 
2001. Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCT or “biscuit” teams) were famously 
developed to advise military interrogators after 9/11 (Margulies 2007, Candilis 2009). 
Psychologists and psychiatrists advised the military on the weaknesses of military detainees, and 
“stress positions,” “sleep deprivation,” and other terms entered the common parlance. Indeed, 
aggressive interrogation techniques became indistinguishable from outright torture.  The 
historical narrative that preceded the notorious involvement of BSCT teams in national security 
provides the context for a discussion of the importance of professional ethics that evolves toward 
acknowledging multiple perspectives in forensic work. We now turn to this historical narrative. 
                                                          
1 This information is drawn from a website documenting the “Timeline of APA Policies and Actions Related to 
Detainee Welfare and Professional Ethics in the Context of Interrogation and National Security” – available at 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/interrogations.aspx  
 13 
In 1985, the APA and the American Psychiatric Association issued a joint statement 
condemning torture and supporting the UN Declaration and Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the UN Principles of Medical 
Ethics, as well as the joint Congressional Resolution opposing torture signed into law by 
President Reagan on October 4, 1984.  In 1986, the APA Council of Representatives approved a 
Resolution Opposing Torture, in which APA noted that “psychological knowledge and 
techniques may be used to design and carry out torture” but that APA “condemns torture 
wherever it occurs.”  This policy has since been reaffirmed by the APA several times.  
However, voices within the profession left room for practitioners to serve security 
interests. In response to heated controversy regarding the appropriateness of involvement in 
military interrogations, the American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Medical Associations 
appointed special committees to explore the ethical aspects of involvement in military 
interrogations (Behnke, 2006). By 2006, each organization had issued their respective position 
statements.  The APA position was published in the “PENS” Task Force report, which we briefly 
discuss first. We then compare and contrast the APA position with the concurrent American 
Psychiatric and Medical Associations before discussing their continuing evolution over the past 
seven years. 
The PENS Task Force Report 
In 2005, the APA Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS Task 
Force) was established to address the controversial role of psychology and psychologists in 
interrogations and give guidance to APA members about work in national security settings.   
The Task Force report was released on July 5, 2005 (see 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2005/07/pens.aspx) and was formally adopted by the 
 14 
APA Board of Directors as APA Policy.  It affirmed the adequacy of the ethics code in 
addressing the ethical dimensions regarding psychologists’ involvement in interrogations and 
other national security-related activities.  It concluded that the ethics code did not prohibit 
psychologists from serving in consultative roles to interrogation or information-gathering 
processes in national security settings. However, the report also found that psychologists have an 
“ethical obligation to be alert to and report any acts of torture or cruel or inhuman treatment to 
appropriate authorities.”  
In fact, the report specifically “rejected the contention that when acting in roles outside 
traditional health-service provider relationships psychologists are not acting in a professional 
capacity as psychologists and are therefore not bound by the APA Ethics Code.”  Thus, the Task 
Force explicitly concluded that the APA ethics code applies to all psychologists – regardless of 
their training, experience, work role, or whether they identified themselves as “psychologists,” 
“behavioral scientists,” or another term.   
The American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Medical Association Positions on 
Involvement in Military Interrogations  
In 2006, the director of the APA Ethics Office, Stephen Behnke, J.D., Ph.D., offered a 
comparison of the ethical foundations of the American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Medical 
Associations’ positions. He concluded that the American Psychological and American Medical 
Association positions were quite similar, but that they were substantively different from the 
position of the American Psychiatric Association. What all three organizations had in common – 
and continue to have in common – is the ethical mandate that no psychologist, psychiatrist, or 
physician ever facilitate or permit torture or other inhumane treatment.  
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Behnke noted that the APA and AMA ethical analyses both rested on balancing two 
obligations: obligations to protect individual human rights against obligations to protect third 
parties and the public. These obligations are derived from the APA aspirational principles of 
beneficence/nonmaleficence and fidelity/responsibility, which address psychologists’ 
responsibilities to society. These are tied explicitly to using psychological knowledge to aid in 
the understanding of human behavior and in the prevention of harm (Behnke, 2006).  In contrast, 
the American Psychiatric Association’s position emphasized protecting individual human rights 
by resting squarely on the “Do no harm” principle. Protecting society was secondary. 
These different approaches led the professional associations to reach different 
conclusions.  Whereas the APA concluded that psychologists could consult to interrogations for 
national-security related purposes under strict ethical guidance (e.g., never serving as a treater 
and interrogator at the same time, not being involved in coercive interrogations, not using 
information from an individual’s medical chart to inform the interrogative methods, reporting 
interrogations in which unethical behaviors occur), the American Psychiatric Association 
concluded that psychiatrists could not ethically consult to interrogations at all, even if the 
interrogation were conducted to “identify other persons who have committed or may be planning 
to commit acts of violence” (Behnke, 2006). 
Controversies over Prioritizing Justice over Individual Welfare 
Finding the appropriate ethical balance between individual and society has continued to 
prove challenging for psychology and psychiatry and underscores the weakness of this 
dichotomous approach.  Prioritizing one’s duty to the hiring organization (for example, 
developing and monitoring interrogation techniques to extract information from enemy 
combatants) over one’s duty to protect individual human rights has proved especially 
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controversial in the last several years.  This is because the PENS Report and the 2002 revision of 
the APA guidelines did not speak directly to the ethics of relative balancing.  
Without clear ethical guidance on the appropriate balance between societal and individual 
rights, some psychologists and psychiatrists prioritized society’s needs over the rights of 
individuals.  This work played out primarily in national security settings where the perceived 
need to protect society was so great. For example, one prominent psychiatrist who advised 
government agencies observed that psychiatrists could legitimately develop and monitor 
interrogation techniques because they acted in a role outside their traditional obligations 
(Phillips, 2005). This approach, known as “exceptionalism” where forensic professionals act 
under an exception to traditional ethical rules, made room for a different ethic when practitioners 
served security interests. Indeed, the APA itself noted professionals’ potentially constructive role 
in recognizing abuse or health concerns. 
In the mid-2000s, when the professional associations were initially considering the 
appropriate ethical balance between individuals and society, many commentators felt that a mere 
balancing of interests could solve the problem of dual agency. Where there were tensions 
between professional values and organizational norms (whether federal, correctional, or judicial), 
practitioners were urged to clarify conflicts, inform parties involved of their agency, and seek 
resolution to the conflict (Allan, 2013). It seemed a sufficient course to address the tension of 
competing values. 
The danger, however, was in the creation of institutional or “artificial” persons (Wolgast, 
2001). Drawing on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Elizabeth Wolgast was among those 
raising the alarm about individual responsibility in the face of organizational values. She applied 
the concept of “artificial,” “feigned,” or “fictional” persons to describe the moral vacuum of 
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individuals speaking or acting on behalf of their institutions (Candilis et al, 2007). At a time 
when security interests were driving societal and professional norms, it was this dynamic that 
created a widening gap between professional values and organizational or societally driven 
goals. It ignored both personal and professional values as moderating influences. 
The historical narrative of the clinical and behavioral sciences raised yet another specter 
during the ascendancy of BSCT teams and behavioral consultation to the armed forces. The 
lessons of Nazi medicine and Soviet psychiatry could not be fully appreciated when 
exceptionalism pushed the behavioral sciences outside traditional clinical norms. The protections 
of individual rights and professional standards were weakened when there were special, 
attenuated rules for the treatment of individuals in the control of the state. The Department of 
Defense’s own regulations at this time confirmed that consulting professionals could behave in a 
manner “inconsistent with traditional medical ethics” (Keram, 2006). 
For forensic psychiatry, exceptionalism reached its zenith with the publication of a theory 
for forensic practice that was based in research ethics (Appelbaum, 1997). This approach to the 
work of forensic practitioners equated forensic practice with the standards of conducting clinical 
research. Research participants could not expect clinical care, but were protected by information 
disclosures and a clear description of the purpose of the research. For forensic practice, social 
values of truth and justice could therefore apply with more force as long as there were 
disclosures on the limits of confidentiality and a clear description of the purposes of the 
encounter. Indeed, forensic professionals could not be useful to society if they remained 
committed to ideals of beneficence: putting the patient first, following ideals of self-actualization 
and protection from harm. 
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The response from other commentators was swift. Some recognized that truth and justice 
could not be served if other voices were not heard. The inequalities of society and the legal 
system were not addressed in simple agency conflicts (Griffith, 1998; Candilis et al 2001). The 
narrative of vulnerable individuals and non-dominant cultures before the bar was not equivalent 
to that of the dominant culture. There could be no justice in professional frameworks that did not 
address the unequal treatment of non-dominant groups. Antiseptic balancing of truth and justice 
rang hollow when the narratives of vulnerable populations and individuals were ignored 
(Candilis, 2009). 
For Michael Norko of Yale (2005) there was even more to forensic practice than truth-
telling or principles of justice. In the move toward a more culturally sensitive practice, Norko 
saw norms of social discourse that relied on basic religious and philosophical systems. The 
biblical Golden Rule and Kant’s “treat others as you would be treated” identified a moral 
foundation of forensic practice based on compassion for the vulnerable individual. Drawn from a 
commonality of human experience and compassion for others, this approach required that the 
law and forensic practice be entrusted to those who understood this obligation between citizens. 
Otherwise, damage to both individuals and institutions would ensue.   
The weaknesses of exceptionalism and strict role theory in the work of forensic 
practitioners were becoming evident. Setting the work of psychological and psychiatric 
consultants outside the traditional norms of practice created a speculative role outside the 
influences of the profession’s historical narrative, the protections of professional codes, and the 
presence of personal values.  Such “artificial persons” had little moral foundation in a world that 
offered multiple ethical influences on forensic professionals. Influences of upbringing, culture, 
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community, training, and mentorship could somehow be submerged in a fanciful construct where 
the needs of an organization merely created an obligation to attenuate the damage.  
Evolving Ethics and Relative Balancing of Justice and Individual Welfare   
The controversy over the involvement of psychological consultants to military 
interrogations was not clarified by the official APA position statement in the PENS Task Force 
report.  In fact, the report left room for interpretation (i.e., permission to prioritize individual’s 
rights over society’s rights, to balance individual and society rights equally, or to prioritize 
society’s rights over individual rights). This created more confusion and controversy than existed 
before the official statements.   
Members of APA – and society at large – reacted strongly to the lack of clear guidance. 
In 2008, for example, members of APA worked without official APA oversight to initiate a 
special resolution to prohibit any psychologist from working in detainee settings in which 
international law or the U.S. Constitution was violated. Exceptions were allowed when the 
psychologist worked directly for the detainees or for an independent party to protect human 
rights, or to provide treatment to military personnel. The resolution went up for a special vote 
and was approved by the APA members shortly thereafter (see 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/11/interrogations.aspx).  
In 2010 as part of this evolving narrative and in recognition of the multiple sources of 
professional ethics (i.e., organizational, societal, personal), the APA Ethics Code was revised to 
reflect the member-initiated resolution.  Specifically, the revisions made clear that psychological 
consultants cannot prioritize society’s demands over individual human rights; that violating 
human rights is not acceptable under any circumstances – in no settings and in no consultation 
roles.  Even now, there is a member-initiated task force drafting a resolution to replace the PENS 
 20 
report with new guidelines and to reconcile policies related to psychologists’ involvement in 
national security settings.   
In making clear that individual human rights must never be violated by psychologists 
acting in any role, psychology’s position has come to resemble psychiatry’s more closely (i.e., 
that psychologists and psychiatrists may prioritize individual welfare over social justice or 
equally balance them, but they may not violate individual human rights to privilege social 
justice).  Both professions continue to engage in an evolving discussion and each has moved in 
the direction of more nuanced ethical guidance for consultants.   
Robust Professionalism: Integrating Values  
For a theory of professional ethics to have meaning, therefore, it must be grounded in its 
roots and direction at the same time. The value of the historical narrative is not merely an appeal 
to tradition, but a grounding in values that have developed and been tested over time. A robust 
professionalism consequently recognizes the contributions of the community and core 
professions that privilege them. A profession with moral integrity – understood here as a matter 
of wholeness or intactness – must continually incorporate community, professional, and even 
personal values in order to have standing among the individuals and communities that it serves. 
Indeed we honor the views of scholars like Ciccone and Clements (2001) who recognize the 
interplay of multiple systems in forensic work, and of Radden (2001) who identifies role-related 
and general obligations nested within each other. Sacrificing elements of professional ethics to 
the setting in which professionals practice weakens the legitimacy of the work and loosens it 
from its moral moorings. Exceptionalism has no place when multiple perspectives enrich the 
analysis. 
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At the same time, an evolution of values is permitted so that discussions of security over 
welfare remain part of the developing narrative. It is not sufficient to close debate in the arena of 
national security or corrections, for that matter, when alternative perspectives still influence the 
discussion so strongly.  Only through recognition of the multiple values influencing forensic 
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